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1 Introduction
Since Roman times, contract has been the basic cell
of economic life upon which most productive rela-
tionships have been based. The principle of free-
dom and sanctity of contract is part of the
commercial life paradigm of Western Europe. In
1989, the Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) embarked on the task of transforming
from economies where bureaucratic relationships
between political actors prevailed, into economies
where contractual relationships between economïc
actors would prevail. The need to put in place a
stable and predictable legal framework for this
transformation has been underlined in numerous
policy documents and academic writings. It can be
argued that such a framework is of particular
importance in the context of Central and Eastern
Europe. First, where private business is weak, it is
vital for its development to introduce standard
terms and to reduce uncertainty (EBRD 1993).
Second, no deeply rooted commercial customs, tra-
dition or implicit codes of conduct existed to rely
upon in the regulation of commercial life, given the
severance of links with the pre-1944 business
experience of the CEECs. Even where a certain link
is preserved, that experience corresponds to a dif-
ferent stage of economic development. Third,
planned economies left the legacy of a huge misal-
location of resources. An effective contractual
regime could assist the transfer of resources to bet-
ter uses. Lastly, foreign direct investment is contin-
gent upon a functioning regulatory system based
on the rule of law.
The transition orthodoxy (Ellman 1997), however,
has failed to focus on the actual dimensions of
transforming the legal framework for commercial
exchange. Little research has been conducted on
the problems of enforcing legal provisions, on the
factors that bear upon this, and on the implications
for the emerging mechanisms of organising com-
mercial life and the overall process of
transformation.
This article examines the state of the legal precon-
ditions for establishing an economic system based
on freedom and enforceability of contract. The
main indicators employed are the existence of a
comprehensive framework of laws governing com-
mercial transactions, while allowing for freedom of
contract and reliable mechanisms for conflict
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resolution. The paper analyses the transformation
of the legal framework in Bulgaria in the period
1990-97. The Bulgarian case seems a particularly
good example, illustrating both problems and
prospects revealed in the process.
2 Methodological flotes
The state of the legal regulation of commercial con-
tract can be approached in two ways. The first con-
stitutes a classical law approach which examines the
introduction of the main institutions of contract law
as well as of the wider commercial law framework.
Traditionally, the law of contract is the core of com-
mercial law which provides the framework within
which the parties can freely transact. This role is ful-
filled by ensuring the following: that law fixes a
standard of behaviour while allowing for free defin-
ition of the terms of contract; that it protects bona
fide market participants acting in the ordinary
course of business; and that it provides for a range
of remedies for a breach of contract. Thus, as the
law and economics literature explains, law of con-
tract facilitates exchange by helping reduce transac-
tion costs and providing for efficient allocation of
economic resources.
The classical legal approach assumes a fairly static
and abstract view of contract and of its economic
and social role. If one introduces a time or cross-
country dimension to legal institutions, however,
one needs a dynamic, context-based approach.
Authors such as Tillotson (1995) argue that full
understanding of the law of contract can only be
achieved if the latter is discussed in the context of
the evolving nature of its relationship with the
political and economic environment, and business
practice.
In CEE, it seems particularly important to discuss
the formal as well as the substantive dimensions of
adoption and implementation of laws. This dual
approach requires an account of the political, eco-
nomic and social factors that influence the develop-
ment of legal institutions. It follows from, first, the
logic of totalitarianism, expressed as total penetra-
tion of all spheres of life by the system of party
bureaucracy According to that logic, law was not an
instrument of regulation but of ritual communica-
tion outside the ideological power structure (Ravel
1985). It was through the latter that business was
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done. Second, the simultaneous, rapid and multi-
faceted transformation in the CEECs makes it
impossible to examine institutions in isolation from
their context.
3 Development of the legal
framework
The transformation of the legal framework govern-
ing commercial transactions in Bulgaria formally
began with the adoption of the new Constitution in
July 1991. The Constitution confirmed the dra-
matic break with the socialist planned economy and
a political commitment to 'the establishment of a
democratic and social state governed by the rule of
law' (Preamble). In the economic sphere, it pro-
claimed the principles of free economic initiative, of
equality of all economic actors, and the protection
of investment and economic activities, as the basis
upon which the new market relations would
develop.
The previous state of affairs was characterised by a
system where private non-business transactions
were regulated by a civil code, the Law on
Obligations and Contracts of 1951; whereas rela-
tions between state-owned enterprises were regu-
lated by special legislation and acts of
administration. The contractual freedom of state
enterprises was limited in the sense that they were
subject to the constraints of central planning and to
political interference, and normally had a limited
range of remedies available for a breach of contract.
Thus, some of the first reform measures were con-
nected with the elimination of this distinction by
repealing the provisions concerning the special con-
tractual regime for state-owned enterprises.
The second main task was the introduction, or
restoration, of commercial law in the private law
system of the country In harmony with the conti-
nental and its own pre-1944 tradition, Bulgaria
opted for a dualist system through the incorpora-
tion of commercial law as a separate branch.
Commercial law was envisaged as a special civil law
of traders, governing the transactions by which the
exchange of goods, services and capital are carried
out or facilitated. Thus, it includes company law,
law of commercial contract, the more specific laws
of transport, insurance and banking contracts, secu-
rïties, maritime, corporate insolvency law and
international commercial law. This special regime,
according to legal theory, would meet the somewhat
contradictory needs of commercial life for flexibility
and speed, through the provision of simplified legal
form, standardisation and uniformity of legal insti-
tutions, and for certainty and stability, through
ensuring greater publicity, protection of the rights of
the weaker parties, more imperative provisions, and
stronger sanctions (Gerdzhikov 1991).
The actual introduction of commercial law, how-
ever, did not proceed in such a neat fashion. It is
important to examine the developments in some of
its main areas.
The reform started with the adoption of the
Commercial Act in July 1991. That law laid
down only the regime regarding the subjects of
commercial law. It adopted a modern approach,
incorporating European legislative provisions on
governance of commercial companies. In addi-
tion to sole proprietors, commercial companies
and cooperatives, the scope of the Act extends
over state- and municipally-owned companies.
The latter governance, transformation and pri-
vatisation, however, were subject to a special
regime incorporating many public administra-
tive law provisions. This regime could be char-
acterised by a constant change in policy
priorities and a lack of good co-ordination
between the institutions responsible, thereby
resulting in an unstable and ambiguous norma-
tive environment.
The law of contract was not substantially
amended until 1993, when some changes to the
Law of Obligations and Contracts were made,
repealing the special regime applicable to state-
oed companies. A new regulation of commer-
cial contracts was adopted only in 1996 in the
form of Part Three of the Commercial Act. These
amendments developed the contractual regula-
tion in accordance with the new market mecha-
nisms. They include regulation of all main
commercial contracts with the exception of a
number of contracts already used in commercial
practice, such as franchising, factoring and
sponsorship, and with the exception of contracts
subject to special regimes, such as privatisation
and stock exchange transactions (Gerdzhikov
1997).
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Banking law was developed within the overall
process of reform of the banking system.
Accordingly, new laws were adopted in 1991
and 1992. The regulation of the banking system,
however, did not provide for efficient banking
supervision. The period could be characterised
by extremely distorted credit behaviour of state
as well as private banks, favouring particular
economic groups and a limited number of loss-
making enterprises (OECD 1997). This resulted
in a severe strain on the state budget in recapi-
talising banks, loss of confidence in the banking
system as a reliable channel for servicing trans-
actions, and a severe financial crisis in 1996. The
regulatory regime was substantially improved in
the summer of 1997.
Regulation on securities transactions was
adopted in 1995 as part of the package of laws
designed to facilitate privatisation through
investment vouchers. It put an end to a period of
spontaneous and non-regulated development of
securities trade which was characterised by a
number of notorious financial pyramid scandals.
The institutional framework for stock exchange
transactions was developed only at the end of
1997.
Legislation on corporate insolvency, being the
final remedy for non-performance of contracts,
was introduced in 1994 as Part Pour of the
Commercial Act.
The review of the main developments shows that
there was a significant delay in introducing the spe-
cial regulation of the law of commercial contract.
On the one hand, this may not necessarily be seen
as negative because one of the main hindrances for
market contracting was removed fairly early by
applying the same regime to all legal subjects
regardless of their ownership. Equally, no problem
existed in the regulation of ordinary transactions.
They were carried out by free contracting on the
basis of the classic institutions of sale, deposit and
loan. Any gap or lack of clarity was resolved by the
application of general civil law.
On the other hand, the regulation was inadequate
as far as the contractual framework for complex
economic initiatives was concerned. Especially in
matters involving financial instruments or currency
options, commercial practice still runs ahead of the
legislation by borrowing contractual models and
adapting foreign business practices. In general, it is
possible to observe that, in addition to its late adop-
tion, the regulation of the complete cycle of busi-
ness exchange, and especially of its financial aspect,
lacked system, continuity and depth. A piecemeal
approach with no comprehensive strategy was fol-
lowed. Ultimately, the unpredictability of rule-mak-
ing posed a burden for planning of economic
resources and increased transaction costs. It also
largely inhibited the interpretation, dispute resolu-
tion and enforceability of contractual obligations.
The process was also influenced by the persistent
strong involvement of the state in economic life,
especially in the area of the transformation of state-
owned enterprises. This, in conjunction with the
delay of privatisation and the lack of continuity in
government priorities, resulted in prolonged politi-
cisation of business decision-making.
The main reasons for the failure of the state to cre-
ate a credible legal environment seem to lie in the
political sphere. The legacy of Bulgarian commu-
nism left society extremely atomised and frag-
mented. Although there were opposition initiatives
before 1989, political reform in Bulgaria was initi-
ated by reform-oriented communists. They were
the only well organised group possessing executive
skills and business experience. They managed to
retain significant control over policymaking, but
also to use their privileged position to gain quick
economic benefits in a period when the old system
was being deconstructed. Powerful groups were
formed that had vested interests in the state of
uncertainty, and they, together with the beneficia-
ries of the previous regime, effectively prevented
significant advances in the transformation. lt was
only gradually that an organised democratic oppo-
sition, able to formulate an alternative viable project
for reform, developed. The opposition sought to
strengthen its economic and social base through
policies of restitution of property to its former own-
ers or their descendants, thus neglecting other tasks
of the transition.
Therefore, the political process resulted in extreme
political instability: there have been eight govern-
ments, including three non-party expert ones, since
1990, which failed to carry out policies on the basis
of agreed priorities for reform. Rather, the state
acted in response to pressure: internal pressure
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generated by the flourishing mafia groups in the
economy, or external pressure, such as the condi-
tions imposed by international financial institutions
(Minchev 1997). Legislative change has often been
simply a part of the electoral platform of some polit-
ical forces. Often, it did not fix best practices, or
aim at putting in place the regulatory function of
law. It aimed at declaring that something is being
done, winning support either at home or abroad,
without actually putting in place a viable frame-
work for a particular policy implementation.
4 Conflict resolution and
enforcement
Normally, the substance of contracts is largely deter-
mined by the will of the parties participating within
the framework defined by law. There are some self-
enforcement mechanisms that work to this end,
such as discussions between the parties or their rep-
utation in the market place. The alternative, how-
ever, is a breach of contract and a commercial
dispute. Traditionally, there are three types of con-
flict resolution mechanisms: court litigation, volun-
tary arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution,
such as mediation and conciliation. Conflict resolu-
tion and enforcement seek to compensate for the
default of one of the parties in providing a market
value. In the absence of such mechanisms, rio cer-
tainty over the contractual relations could be
ensured and this would ultimately result in ineffi-
cient allocation of resources.
Conflict resolution and enforcement by the
courts
Effective and reliable judicial enforcement is one of
the legal fundamentals of any contractual regime. It
has been the consistent opinion of businesses,
lawyers and policymakers that the Bulgarian court
system is inefficient, clumsy and costly to the extent
that it has been meaningless to rely on it for conflict
resolution in a dynamic market environment. The
court statistics for the years 1993-95 published by
the ministry of justice confirm the slowness of the
system. Despite a slight increase in the number of
new claims filed to the courts, especially of claims
resulting from contractual disputes, there is a
decline in the number of civil law cases on trial, as
revealed in Table 1. Table 2 demonstrates an
extremely high percentage of hearings adjourned,
and a steady increase in the number of cases
Table 1: New civil claims and cases on trial
Source: Ministry of Justice Bulletin
Table 2: Court efficiency: cases adjourned and cases completed as a percentage of
total cases on trial
Source: Ministry of Justice Bulletin
Table 3: Efficiency of enforcement procedure: number of claims filed and of cases completed
Source: Ministry of Justice Bulletin
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1993 1994 1995 1996
District courts I instance
New civil claims 22,418 22,796 23,426 ria.
of these: - new contractual claims 6,879 7,971 8,216 n.a.
- cases between traders 5,718 5,918 5,871 6,212
Total cases on trial 142,805 113,031 107,789 n.a.
Company law cases on trial 120, 805 90,235 84,363 67,124
District courts II instance (total) 19,520 20,795 21,587 n.a.
1993 1994 1995
Local courts
Hearings adjourned (per cent) 58.65 54.01 60.96
District courts I instance
Hearings adjourned (per cent) 67.51 64.61 65.34
Unfinished cases (per cent) 11.95 17.00 20.58
District courts II instance
Hearings adjourned (per cent) 25.04 28.33 31.84
Unfinished cases (per cent) 24.34 24.08 31.84
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Claims 120,060 96,056 93,626 138,048 102,259 90,882 112,957
Completed cases 114,240 98,597 93,052 107,665 95,337 81,340 94,115
unfinished towards the end of each year. The analy-
sis of the progress in the enforcement of judicial
decisions (Table 3) reveals a drastic increase in the
percentage of unfinished cases relative to new
claims made. As a number of annual reports of the
ministly of justice show, this ratio is particularly
high for enforcement cases in favour of commercial
companies and banks. Such delays are particularly
damaging to the quality of compensation, given the
prolonged periods of high inflation in the country.
A number of reasons can be advanced for the state
of affairs described above. For example, the diffi-
culties in enforcement of remedies could be attrib-
uted to the multitude of unsecured contracts and to
the behaviour of banks in fulfilling court orders.
The emphasis here will be on legal factors, such as
the need for reform of the Judiciary and of the civil
litigation procedure.
One of the first measures in the reform of the
Judiciary system was to ensure its depoliticisation
and independence. The new Constitution of 1991
proclaimed the principle of separation of powers
and independence of the court system from the rest
of government. It provided for independent gover-
nance of the Judiciary by a High Court Council and
prohibited party membership of judges. The coun-
cil had to be elected by parliament and the mem-
bers of the Judiciary itself. The Law on the High
Court Council was passed during the same summer.
Another area of reform of the Judiciary was the abo-
lition of the system of state arbitration, introduced in
1950 as one of the mechanisms of central planning.
lt consisted of a High Arbitration Court and district
arbitration courts as well as intra-industiy courts of
arbitration. These courts were the only institutions to
resolve conflicts between state enterprises. Disputes
with an international dimension were adjudicated by
a special Arbitration Commission for Foreign
Commerce. In 1988, an Arbitration Court was estab-
lished with the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry which replaced the commission. The sys-
tem of state arbitration was repealed in 1992, and the
arbitration courts dissolved. It was decided to estab-
lish a unitary system of justice, where the general
courts would decide on civil as well as commercial
cases between economic actors acting within the gen-
eral litigation procedure, thus assuming the functions
of the state arbitration courts as well.
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The deconstruction of the old system of justice was
carried out by 1992. The transformation of the
courts system to meet the demands of a market
economy, however, was crucially delayed. The
Constitution of 1991 provided for a reform of the
court system from a two-tier to a three-tier one.
Nevertheless, no practical measures for the reorgan-
isation of the court system were taken at that stage.
The structural reform did not proceed any further
until 1994, when the Judiciary Act was adopted.
The act laid down the details for the organisation of
the system. Its entry into force was delayed by many
of its provisions being challenged at the
Constitutional Court. Finally, elections for the
supreme courts and the other main structural
changes were initiated in 1997. It is certain that the
lack of reform did not relieve the workload of the
existing Supreme Court: its need to act both as an
appeal court and a court of final instance was a
major reason for the delays.
It has to be pointed out that throughout the period
under examination, no major changes to the rules
of the Civil Litigation Code of 1952 were made. The
order of proceedings, the substantive requirements
and procedure for appeals, the system of summons,
the enforcement mechanisms, and the system of
interlocutory injunctions were inadequate to the
requirements of a conflict resolution process char-
acterised by speed, efficiency and reliability It was
only with the amendments of 1997 that several
important changes were introduced. First, the
adversarial system of litigation was promoted, thus
reducing the workload of judges and avoiding
delays in clearing cases. Then, the system of sum-
mons, which was a major reason for postponing
hearings, was improved. Special attention was paid
to the litigation discipline of the parties through
increased sanctions for abuse of procedural rights.
Not exercising procedural rights in good faith
seemed to be one of the main problems of post-
1990 disputes. Some of the mechanisms for enforc-
ing remedies for a breach of contract were changed
with the aim of improving the speed and effective-
ness of delivering compensation. The changes,
however, are still subject to serious criticisms for
giving endless appeal opportunities, for not provid-
ing for proper co-ordination with administrative
law appeals, and for not improving sufficiently the
enforcement mechanisms system.
Another major impediment to effective conflict res-
olution by the Judiciary was related to human
resources. A general lack of sufficient numbers of
judges has been reported every year by the ministry
of justice. Although some measures were taken, in
total about 10 per cent of the judicial positions in
the local courts, and between 16 and 20 per cent of
the positions in the district courts, remained unoc-
cupied throughout the period. In 1995 there was no
court working with a full number of judges. The
problem of understaffing was particularly acute in
the bailiff departments, dealing with the practical
enforcement of judicial decisions, in more remote
areas of the country. Judges leave because of low
pay and the higher profits in the private sphere.
Many judges had never before dealt with commer-
cial cases and the growing pressure in a changing
economic and legal environment proved decisive.
The positions have been filled with new graduates
with no experience at all in running court proceed-
ings and resolving complex commercial matters. In
1993, for example, 65 per cent of the judges in the
local courts had less than one year's job experience.
As a result, judges with insufficient professional
experience were promoted to the district courts. The
professional qualification of judges clearly becomes a
problem which affects the quality of judicial acts and
the speed with which they are announced. For
bailiffs, in particular, given the lack of court police,
the issue of personal security has become an impor-
tant disincentive for efficïent performance.
The activities of the Judiciary are also influenced by
questions of proper administration. The lack of
properly qualified administrative staff has been
reported as a major impediment to the efficient
operation of courts. Material resources for creating
normal working conditions in terms of equipment,
databases, libraries etc. are badly lacking. Thus, the
cost of the transformation of the Judiciary proved to
be beyond the means of the state budget.
The troubled reform of the Judiciary demonstrates,
on the one hand, that it was not among the priori-
ties of the transition process. No political consensus
really existed on the importance of a well function-
ing Judiciary as a guarantee for the rule of law. The
problems of corruption and the links between the
state and organised crime were recognised and
addressed only in 1997. The 'lawlessness syndrome'
(World Bank 1997) was a good way of
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accumulating capital or preserving a position. On
the other hand, a legal reform of this scale requires
substantial legal qualification and a sense of history
on the part of its authors. Despite the fast learning
process that a whole generation of lawyers and
businessmen is going through, time is necessary for
specialised experience to accumulate.
Other conflict resolution mechanisms
As discussed above, the system of state arbitration
was abolished in 1992. The only arbitration court
that remained was the one attached to the Bulgarian
Commercial and Industrial Chamber. The
Arbitration Court substantially reformed its statute
and rules of procedure to meet the new market con-
ditions. Thus, a possibility existed for combining
the advantage of dispute resolution by arbitrators
experienced in dealing with economic transactions,
especially those with a foreign trade dimension, and
of a cheaper procedure characterised by greater
speed, simplicity and confidentiality
The annual reports of the Arbitration Court reveal a
steady decline of requests for international arbitra-
tion, from 183 in 1992 to 48 in 1996. The requests
for domestic arbitration have been more stable over
time: approximately 100 cases per year. Unlike the
situation in the courts system, between only 10 and
13 per cent of the cases have been postponed,
mostly for reasons of difficulties in summons. On
average, more than 60 per cent of domestic claims
have been resolved within six months of being filed,
which reveals the potential of arbitration as a dis-
pute-solving mechanism. The small number of
applications filed with the Arbitration Court,
according to some arbiters, could be explained by
lack of confidence in the court, given the legacy of
partiality and corruption of many of its members. In
addition, the decisions do not deliver sufficient pro-
tection for the rights of the parties in terms of
enforcement of remedies.
Nevertheless, the potential of arbitration as a dis-
pute-solving mechanism has been proved by the
growing number of new arbitration courts set up by
voluntary civil or professional organisations: the
Association of Economic Initiative of Citizens, the
Association of Commercial Banks, and the National
Union of Corporate Lawyers. There are also discus-
sions on the need to employ this mechanism in
insurance and labour disputes.
5 Conclusions
The review of developments in Bulgaria shows that
adequate legal preconditions for an economic sys-
tem based on the rule of law and enforceability of
contractual obligations were not put in place.
Piecemeal methods of rule-making were employed,
which put a strain on implementation and created
an unpredictable regulatory environment.
Bureaucratic and politically motivated action per-
sisted, interfering with the principle of freedom of
contract. The slow reform of the Judiciary deprived
market participants of an effective protection of
their lawful interests. However, after the financial
and political crisis of 1996, dramatic improvements
in the legal framework were made during 1997 (see
section 4 above).
The difficulties of substantive transformation of
legal institutions are tightly connected with the
characteristics of the political process in Bulgaria
and with the lack of clear reform priorities. The
state failed to establish itself as an impartial, legiti-
mate regulator of economic life. As a result, the
totalitarian economy was largely transformed into a
criminal rather than a market economy There are
also important objective reasons, such as the cost of
legal reform and the intense learning this requires
on the part of the whole society
It is difficult to establish a strict causation link
between the problems of the development of the
legal contractual framework and the dynamics of
the economic transition. The general question of
how much legal regulation markets need in order to
operate, could be raised in the context of Central
and Eastern Europe too. Businesses respond to reg-
ulatory failures by developing various forms of
inter-firm integration and relying on old social net-
works. In this article, however, it was argued that
legal fundamentals related to the sense of equity
and stability of business life are especially important
in the post-totalitarian context. The example of
Bulgaria illustrates this at great social cost.
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